The absence of a comprehensive screening system for cargo, such as air cargo, represents a major soft spot in the current United States security system, such as the air travel security system. A report prepared by the Federal Aviation Administration's office of aviation security research and development in October of 2001 warned of “catastrophic” flaws in the air cargo security system, according to “USA Today” (trademarked) in May of 2002. On Jun. 10, 2002, the “Washington Post” (trademarked) reported that an internal Transportation Security Administration (TSA) analysis described security for cargo on passenger planes as “easily circumvented.” The “Washington Post” (trademarked) quoted an internal TSA report as stating: “Cargo is likely to become—and may already be—the primary threat vector in the short term.” Still another TSA document placed the risk of a terrorist attack via cargo as high as “35 to 65 percent,” according to the “Washington Post”. According to an internal assessment, TSA needs to “improve [cargo] security and reduce risk as soon as possible,” the Post reported.
Currently as much as forty percent of air cargo is shipped on passenger planes. Only a negligible percentage of cargo is currently screened—as little as two to four percent, according to current Transportation Security Administration head John Magaw. At present the air cargo security system depends almost entirely on “known shipper” rules. While rules have been tightened since October of 2001, there is broad agreement among experts and officials that nothing in the current system guarantees against determined terrorists gaining access to air-bound cargo and planting an explosive device. Given that roughly seventy-five million tons of cargo is shipped by air in the United States annually from scores of airports, the system presents potential attackers with multiple points of vulnerability.